Learning the rules: resources on the complexities of counter-terrorism in Australia
ANDREW ZAMMIT • July 31, 2019
If you search "Australian counter-terrorism" in Google Image, the results are usually pictures of heavily armed police officers or soldiers, possibly raiding a house, guarding an iconic location, or standing outside an armoured vehicle. There are good reasons for the popularity of such attention-grabbing images; they convey the idea of preventing deadly acts of terrorism more simply than images of people sitting behind desks.
However, while the police and military services both play crucial roles, counter-terrorism also involves many other parts of Australia's system of government.
This has long been the case, and can be seen in the composition of the first committee to ever deliberate on counter-terrorism in Australia. In 1972, the McMahon government established the Inter-Departmental Committee on Terrorism and Political Violence, in the aftermath of the Munich Olympics massacre. Historian Mark Finnane has shown how the committee consisted of the Attorney-General's Department, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Immigration, the Department of Labour and National Service, and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and that it consulted with the Department of Civil Aviation, the Department of Customs and Excise, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Shipping and Transport, and the Postmaster-General's Department.
Finnane noted that this shows how “terrorism was emerging as a multi-dimensional focus of security governance”, which remains the case today. While several of these departments no longer exist, many different parts (and levels) of government continue play important roles in counter-terrorism.
In this post, I share a collection of resources that provide an inside look at different counter-terrorism roles played by various government bodies, including the police but not limited to them. These resources provide insights from:
· Coroners who have led inquests when counter-terrorism has gone wrong and people have been killed;
· Police officers who have been involved in the monitoring, investigation and arrest of terrorist suspects.
· Judges who have presided over the trials of accused terrorists, which often involved new and untested laws;
· Statutory officials who have been tasked with overseeing the use of counter-terrorism laws and other national security powers; Plenty of media coverage often focuses on the latest counter-terrorism raids, whether the latest terrorist plot foreshadows a bigger shift in the nature of the threat, the latest declaration that new legislation is urgently needed.
While those are all important, I created this resource collection to highlight less prominent issues. These resources demonstrate the long-standing and difficult issues counter-terrorism poses across many areas of government, and the experiences of people involved in working inside these areas. They help provide insight into the on-the-ground realities of counter-terrorism, and into the difficulties of devising, interpreting, and implementing, the rules for counter-terrorism in different institutional contexts.
I also hope that these resources might be useful for students and researchers, looking for ideas for their next paper or project. Most of these are open-access, except for some of the Joint Counter Terrorism Team resources, and they are all either written by former insiders or based on interviews with insiders.
LESSONS FROM CORONERS
John Olle, “Finding - Inquest into the Death of Ahmad Numan Haider”, Coroners Court of Victoria, 31 July 2017
Numan Haider was shot dead after stabbing two counter-terrorism officers in Melbourne on 23 September 2014. This report contains the findings of the coronial inquest into his death, shows the build up to Haider's actions and also the way different parts of the counter-terrorism apparatus responded.
The report shows the interactions between ASIO, Victoria Police's Security and Organised Crime Intelligence Unit (SOCIU) and the Victorian Joint Counter Terrorism Team (JCTT) as they attempted to make sense of the risk Haider posed and decide the best way to respond. It also discusses how national security considerations complicate the traditional processes of a coronial inquest.
Michael Barnes, “Inquest into the deaths arising from the Lindt Café siege: Findings and recommendations”, State Coroner of New South Wales, May 2017
Man Haron Monis’ seizure of hostages at the Lindt Café in Sydney’s Martin Place on 15 December 2014 resulted in his own death and that of two hostages. The inquest resulted in this detailed 495-page report into the tragedy.
The report shows the inside story of ASIO and various police services’ interaction with Monis, and of how agencies responded to the siege itself. It also discusses whether the siege should indeed be considered an act of terrorism. This report proved consequential, as the NSW and Federal governments agreed to implement many of its recommendations.
INSIDE THE JOINT COUNTER TERRORISM TEAMS
Paul Maley, "The monsters in the granny flat", The Weekend Australian Magazine, 9 September 2017 (paywalled)
This article examines Operation Castrum, an investigation by the New South Wales Joint Counter Terrorism Team into two Islamic State supporters who plotted to firebomb a Shia house of worship in Sydney and then attack one or more people with a blade.
In the article, Detective Chief Inspector Darren Sly, a key participant in Operation Castrum shares his personal experiences of how this plot was foiled. The article provides insight into the inside workings of JCTTs, which were created in each State in the early 2000s, and consists of members of the Australian Federal Police (AFP), ASIO, the relevant state police service, and sometimes other organisations such as the NSW Crime Commission. It also discusses the emotional toll for counter-terrorism officers working in states of such high urgency.
Sam Mullins, "Counter-terrorism in Australia: practitioner perspectives", Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, Volume 11, Issue 1, 2016 (paywalled)
This journal article is based on interviews with counter-terrorism officers from ASIO, the AFP, Victoria Police, and New South Wales Police, who were also part of Joint Counter Terrorism Teams. While the previous article goes into detail on one key operation, this article provides a broad picture of counter-terrorism policing across Australia over many years.
The officers interviewed discuss a range of counter-terrorism dilemmas. These include the difficulties of agencies with different cultures and procedures having to work together, and of being involved in cases with great potential for political controversy. They also discuss the stress of working on counter-terrorism due to the awareness that any mistakes could prove fatal, particularly as these investigations are characterised by long periods of patient monitoring (trying to figure out whether the suspects have serious violent plans or are just talking tough) followed by a sudden need for urgent action to save lives. Most of the interviews were conducted before the rise of Islamic State, but a section at the end covers this development, how it resulted in many terrorist plots that use simpler methods and proved much harder to disrupt, and the impact this has had on counter-terrorism operations.
REFLECTIONS FROM JUDGES
Roslyn Atkinson, "Managing Terrorism Trials" paper delivered at the Supreme and Federal Court Judges Conference 2017, QldJSchol 3, 2017
Justice Roslyn Atkinson presided over the trial of Omar Succarieh, who was prosecuted in 2016 for sending money to the jihadist group Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. Jabhat al-Nusra was an al-Qaeda affiliate at the time and Omar’s brother, Ahmed Succarieh, was the first Australian suicide bomber in Syria. The resulting trial was Queensland’s first counter-terrorism prosecution.
Justice Atkinson oversaw the trial, and in this paper she reflects on dealing with the media, with expert witnesses, and the various ways that terrorism trials differ from ordinary criminal trials. The paper delves into difficult decisions about whether particular evidence should be admitted, and about how to maintain the necessary security measures for the trial without it prejudicing the jury. The paper also discusses the accused terrorist’s religious requirements, pointing out that respecting and supporting Omar Succarieh’s religious observance helped the trial run smoothly. Justice Atkinson also goes into detail on how she decided what directions to give the jury to ensure they understood what they were being asked to deliberate on, which she points out was not a simple task given the complexity of Australia’s counter-terrorism laws.
Anthony Whealy, “The Impact of Terrorism Related Laws on Judges Conducting Criminal Trials”, Supreme and Federal Court Conference 2007 (you will need to scroll to page 85 of the PDF)
Justice Anthony Whealy was the judge for the trial of Faheem Lodhi, who plotted a terrorist attack in Sydney in 2004, and for the trials of the Sydney-based participants of the plot foiled in 2005 by Operation Pendennis.
In this speech Justice Whealy reflects on making sense of Australia’s counter-terrorism laws, as he was among the first judges to oversee a terrorism trial after the new laws had been introduced. He mainly focuses on dealing with the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act and how he had to ensure that its use did not risk being unfair to the accused terrorists. He also discusses the difficulties of imposing some of the first prison sentences for terrorism offences in Australia.
INSIGHTS FROM OVERSEERS
Bret Walker, "Reflections of a Former Independent National Security Legislation Monitor", AIAdminLawF 16, 84 AIAL Forum 74, 2016
Bret Walker was Australia's first Independent National Security Legislation Monitor. This was a position created by the Gillard government in 2010 and modelled on the United Kingdom's Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation.
In this paper, Walker reflects on the importance of the position, on the laws about the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)'s Special Intelligence Operations, and accountability for counter-terrorism in general.
Vivienne Thom, "Reflections of a Former Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security", AIAdminLawF 2, 83 AIAL Forum 11, 2016
Vivienne Thom was the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, from 2010-2015. This position was created by the Hawke government in 1986 and acts as a sort of “standing royal commission” on Australia’s intelligence services.
Vivienne Thom’s article focuses less on counter-terrorism than Walker’s, and more on intelligence oversight generally. However, it similarly discusses ASIO’s Special Intelligence Operations, which are primarily a counter-terrorism tool. It also discusses whether the growth of Australia’s intelligence agencies after 9/11, and public controversies such as the Snowden leaks, create a need for stronger oversight.
CONCLUSION
As these resources show, counter-terrorism impacts many areas of government in Australia. Some institutions that do not normally deal with counter-terrorism (such as coroners' courts) sometimes find themselves playing a prominent role (as seen with the Lindt Cafe siege inquiry), while some institutions play a more of a day-to-day counter-terrorism role than commonly recognised.
These resources also show how counter-terrorism requires institutions to constantly adapt to new rules and expectations. Coroners have to deal with classified intelligence information and make judgements on police counter-terrorism actions. Judges have to create new rules based on their interpretations of more and more counter-terrorism laws, while trying to protect traditional legal principles. Police in specialised units learn how to take approaches that differ greatly from traditional police work. And overseers have to assess whether agencies are acting within the rules and whether the rules are appropriate.
The events that seize the most attention – a violent attack, a police raid, or a political announcement – can easily overshadow the more mundane difficulties that counter-terrorism gives rise to across Australia’s system of government. This resource collection should help provides insight into the complicated problems that counter-terrorism poses, the wide range of work people undertake in these areas, and into some of the lived experiences of those involved.